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Finitistic Properties of High Complexity
Abstract: We use fast-growing finite and infinite sequences of natural numbers and
more complicated constructs to define models of hypercomputation and interpret
non-arithmetic predicates, with the strongest extensions reaching full second order
arithmetical truth and beyond. Since the predicates are interpreted using properties
of certain natural finite structures, they are arguably finitistic.
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1 Introduction
Finitism refers to definitions and arguments that do not use an actual infinity, though
they may involve a potential infinity. The potential infinity refers to the fact that the
natural numbers are unlimited, and that there are arbitrarily large natural numbers.
Hyperfinitism by contrast deals only with "small" natural numbers, such as those
whose binary representation is feasible.
The central question about finitism is which properties are definable and which
claims are demonstrable finitistically. At one extreme is the view that finitistic
properties are the recursive ones, and that finitistic demonstration does not go much
further beyond PRA. At the other extreme is the view that every definable property
(including the truth predicate of set theory) of natural numbers can be defined
finitistically, and that every true mathematical claim is finitistically demonstrable. On
that view, infinite structures are useful as conceptual aids and for argument
simplification, but can ultimately be replaced by finitistically definable finite
analogues. Finitistic strong consistency proofs can involve either new finitistic
properties or just new insights about the recursive properties. Most logicians hold a
narrow view of finitistic definability because of absence of evidence to the contrary.
Plausibly finitistic ways to define properties of high complexity or to prove strong
consistency statements were simply not known before this paper (or at least not as
generally known or developed). One compromise view is that philosophically, there is
a continuum of notions between being fully finitistic and using infinity, and our results
help to elucidate that continuum. And one formalist (or under Platonism, metaphoric)
view is that our notions are an alternative approach to infinity: Infinity can be
expressed directly (using infinite sets) or indirectly as idealization of large numbers
and fast growing sequences and other constructs (as this paper develops). In any
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case, whether or not the definitions here are finitistic, they enrich our foundational
understanding by interpreting statements involving infinity as properties of certain
natural finite structures.
Hypercomputation refers to idealized computers computing non-recursive functions.
Models of hypercomputation can be divided into two types. One uses oracles, either
directly or through some auxiliary mechanism. The other uses an infinite amount of
computation in finite time. In the models we propose (which are technically oracle
based), finite computations correspond to infinite computations by using fast-growing
sequences to convert unbounded searches into bounded ones.
In a way, this paper complements my paper [1], especially the last section, and its
follow-up [2]. These papers use largeness to extend the language — of number theory
in this paper, and of set theory in the other papers — though here the extensions are
definable in preexisting mathematics.
For each notion here, the strategy is to intuitively define the notion using just finite
numbers, give a formal definition using infinite sets, argue that the intuitive and
formal notions agree, and prove the complexity of the formal notion. Precise notions
will be intuitively defined by defining a vague notion and then defining the precise
notion such that the definition does not depend on how vagueness is resolved. In the
infinitary formal treatment, possibilities for the vague notion will form a directed
system such that every sufficiently large choice works correctly.
The second section describes computation using a single sufficiently fast-growing
infinite sequence. The third section discusses computation using multiple sequences.
The fourth section presents similar results for finite sequences. The fifth section
describes an arguably finitistic way to compute  truth. The sixth section uses
estimators to extend the results to full second order arithmetic, and the final section
goes beyond second order arithmetic using transfinite levels of estimators (7.1),
pattern enumerators (7.2), and countable infinity (7.3). We also uncover connections
for different levels of notions, including connections with games and determinacy at
the levels of open determinacy (for a single sequence), determinacy for the 
difference hierarchy (for multiple sequences), projective determinacy (using
estimators), and beyond (using pattern enumerators).
2 A Model of Hypercomputation
A powerful model of hypercomputation rests on a surprisingly mild physical
assumption:
There is a type of event that occurs an unlimited number of times, but with
frequency of occurrence decreasing sufficiently fast.
Definition 2.1: A language  is recognized by a Turing machine with the fast-
growing sequence oracle iff there is a total function  such that for every  with
 (for every natural number ), the machine using  as an oracle halts on
input  iff  is in .
A variation on the definition would be to require  to be sufficiently large relative
to , but the expressive power is the same as we can get the
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stronger version using . In this section, we will use
"for every sufficiently fast-growing , " to mean ,
but the strict version of "sufficiently fast-growing"  requires
. Also, for us, it is insufficient for  to just be
fast-growing asymptotically since the Turing machine must be chosen independent of
.
It is not known whether such machines are physically constructible. Currently, the
biggest problem is surviving for the extremely long time required, rather than the
apparent lack of the required physical events. In any case, studying the machines
improves our understanding of the recursion theory. Below, we prove that a language
is recognized by such a hypercomputer iff it is . Thus, a language is decidable in
the model iff it is hyperarithmetic. Note that  rather than  is the correct
analogue of recursively enumerable.
Theorem 2.2: Recognizability for Turing machines with the fast-growing sequence
oracle equals .
Proof: For a sufficiently fast-growing sequence , a recursive relation has an infinite
descending path through  iff it has an infinite descending path through  and then
through a natural number less than  where  is the length of the given
recursive definition of the relation. By König's lemma, if the relation is well-founded,
then the tree is finite, and thus the machine searching it will eventually discover that
the relation is well-founded.
For the converse, for each machine and input in the theorem, the machine halts iff for
every  there is a halting computation such that the answers the machine
receives are at least as large as the answers given by .
If we do not require a Turing machine to act uniformly on all sufficiently fast-growing
, we have the following.
Theorem 2.3:
(a) The set of Turing machines that halt for some sufficiently fast-growing  (that is
 is sufficiently large relative to  and the Turing machine) is -complete.
(b) The set of Turing machines that halt for every monotonic sufficiently fast-growing
 is -complete.
(c) The set of Turing machines that halt for every sufficiently fast-growing  equals
(under many-one reduction) the game quantifier for -games on integers. This also
applies to  formulas in place of Turing machines.
Notes:
* The theorem (and the proof) relativizes to a real parameter.
* As a corollary, (b) also holds for the class of  with  sufficiently large and
 sufficiently large relative to .
* Game quantifier is the set of codes of games (given a coding) for which the first
player has a winning strategy.
* Lack of monotonicity makes the condition in (c) less natural. The bound in (c) is far
beyond a finite iteration of the hyperjump.
Proof:
(a) Follows from the proof of Theorem 2.2.
(b) Given a Turing machine , consider the following game:
Player II:  (a number)
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repeat:
    Player I: next  values of a sequence 
    Player II: next  values [alternatively, one value] of a monotonic sequence  with
each ; new value of .
First player wins iff  halts using .
This is an open game on integers, so the game quantifier (the set of  for which
player I wins) is . If  halts for every sufficiently fast-growing monotonic , then
player I wins (by playing a sufficiently fast-growing ). Conversely, if for some
sufficiently fast-growing monotonic ,  does not halt, then player II wins because for
every strategy for player I, player II can make  into any monotonic function that is
sufficiently fast-growing relative to the player I strategy. (Proof sketch: Given a well-
behaved bound  derived from player I strategy, and a desired , choose
the least  to get to a gap . This works since  is
sufficiently small relative to .)
(c) To compute a  ( )-game quantifier, modify the game by requiring
each move to be below g(2*number_coding_the_play_so_far), and modify the winning
condition to , and halt if the first player has a
winning strategy. Here we use  being sufficiently large for even numbers, the
possibility of  for odd numbers being sufficiently large relative to  for even
numbers, determinacy, and König's lemma.
Conversely, a Turing machine  halts for every sufficiently fast-growing  iff the first
player wins the following game: At move , the first player plays  (thus defining 
), while the second player may pass or play  where  is the least such
that  has not yet been determined. The first player wins if  halts using , or
some  is undefined. Given a first player strategy, the second player can make 
into an arbitrary sufficiently fast-growing function by delaying playing  until it is
not too large relative to the move number.
Also, given the universal quantification, a  formula can be coded by a Turing
machine that halts once the proposed function is inconsistent with being a
counterexample.
For readers familiar with forcing, another interesting quantifier is "for every generic
sufficiently fast-growing sequence" which is equivalent to "for every Hechler real (as
a sequence of integers) with a sufficiently long initial segment removed". For non-
absolute properties, the two versions are (1) -generic, and (2) (in line with this
paper) generic for a sufficiently complete countable model (using Template Definition
4.2) but existing in . Hechler reals satisfy every open property (from the list of
properties in the ground model) that is dense on sufficiently fast-growing sequences.
To the extent determinacy holds, all such reals have the same properties for
properties (in the ground model) that are not altered by removing a finite initial
segment of the sequence. The sequences are not monotonic (in a sense anything that
can happen happens), but we can define variants for monotonic, strictly monotonic,
and the strict version (as used beneath Definition 2.1).
Theorem 2.4: A predicate is arithmetically definable from every sufficiently fast-
growing sequence iff it is recursive in a finite hyperjump of 0.
Proof:
    The computation of hyperjump relativizes, with each extra quantifier capturing
another hyperjump.
    For the converse, we show that for every arithmetic ,  is
N f
N g
g(n) ≥ f(n) N > 0
T g
T
Π11 T g
f
g T
g
h g(n) > h3n(0)
N g(n+ 1) > h(h(g(n))) (g(n),N)
g(n+ 1)
Σ02 ∃m∀nφ(m,n)
∃m∀n < g(2m+ 1)φ(m,n, play)
g
g g
T g
n f(n) f
g(m) ≥ f(m) m
g(m) T g
g(n) g
g(n)
Π11
V
V
φ {n : ∀Gφ(n,G)}
4
recursive in a finite hyperjump of 0, where  ranges over Hechler reals.
(Furthermore, non-uniformity in φ would not help, as there would still be a forcing
condition that forces uniform definability.) Thus  is (but for an arbitrary initial
segment) a generic sufficiently fast-growing sequence. The conditions for Hechler
forcing are (in one formulation)  (  and ) where  is as at least
as strong as , denoted  iff  and  and
. Using basic properties of forcing, a formula holds for every  if every
condition forces it. A condition  forces  iff it forces  for every 
. A condition  forces  (  a statement that may use ) iff no stronger condition
forces .
    To get the required complexity, let us say that fast-growing  forces a
statement iff the statement is forced by  for every sufficiently fast-growing
 extending . (This implies, for example, . Also,  itself is
not required to be fast-growing.) If we care only about a set of statements whose
number is bounded relative to , there are particular conditions equivalent to fast-
growing , and furthermore (letting  and  vary) the set of such conditions
is dense. Combining all together, a fast-growing  forces  iff there is
a rate of growth  such that for every  every fast-growing  forces  provided
that  extends  and . A fast-growing  forces  iff there is a
rate of growth  such that no fast-growing  forces  provided that  extends  and
. By induction on the complexity of the formula, this has the required
complexity, the key point being that  plays no role in checking whether fast-growing
 (which is finite) forces a statement.
Computational Complexity
For each machine, input, and the set of possible , we may define its computation
tree, where we start at the root, each vertex is a query to , and each branch is an
answer to the query, and we may define the ordinal given machine and input as the
ordinal depth of the computation tree for the set of sufficiently fast-growing  (where
'sufficiently fast-growing' may depend on the machine and input). Intuitively, the
ordinal says how long in the worst case the computation will take relative to the rate
of growth of . From there, the ordinal for a machine is the supremum of ordinals
across inputs (assuming the machine always halts for sufficiently fast-growing ),
and the ordinal for a problem is smallest ordinal for a machine (whose output is
independent of the choice of a sufficiently fast-growing ) that solves the problem.
Theorem 2.5: For each recursive ordinal , the ordinal for a problem is at most  iff
the problem is recursive in  (αth Turing jump of 0).
Proof: To compute , given an input , compute  up to , and then check
whether machine  halts on  before getting out of bounds. The computation depth
is , as required (for limit ,  can be computed as a sequence of lower Turing
jumps).
Conversely, given a computation tree of depth  for sufficiently fast-growing
sequences, start with accepting halting positions (without checking rate of growth),
and work backwards, and at each stage, mark positions such that for every
sufficiently large answer, the resulting position was marked. For , note that
each level adds a -quantifier, so  levels merge into  as required. (Each
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quantifier is  since assuming the sequence so far was sufficiently fast-growing, and
given that we measure at maximum depth, every sufficiently large choice for the next
element will give the same acceptance value.)
Informally, we can speak of computational complexity on a much more fine-grained
level as follows: A problem can be solved in time  if there is a Turing machine
and a natural set  such that the machine using  solves the problem in time 
and that if , the machine using  correctly solves the problem. Thus,
recursive languages have recursive complexity, arithmetic languages have arithmetic
complexity, and so on. The converse might be false, and it is unclear what the
complexity of the inverse Busy Beaver function should be. Unfortunately, we do not
know how to define complexity formally because using unnatural  we can code
solutions to recursive problems as follows: If instance  is true, set  to a certain
value, and otherwise make  larger, and similarly with  being false and
. One mitigation (which still breaks down at high complexity) would be to
make  sufficiently sparse, for example by requiring that  is coded through a binary
tape with sequential access such that every '1' is at a position  (for some n) and
that if a '1' is position , the next '1' cannot occur until position . That way, for
problems with easily verifiable solutions there is at most a polylogarithmic speed up
(relative to the running time) as we can try all possible initial oracle tape segments.
3 Strengthenings to Multiple Sequences
Still higher complexity is reachable by computers that use a sufficiently fast-growing
function  and a function  that grows sufficiently fast relative to . We can extend
the model to allow more sequences, each of which growing sufficiently fast relative to
the previous ones. We can even (not part of definition 3.1) allow transfinitely many
sequences through the use of diagonalization.
Definition 3.1: A language L is recognizable by a Turing machine with the fast-
growing level  sequence oracle iff there is a Turing a machine T and a function
 with f(A)(n) depending only on a finite (but dependent on ) segment of
 such that for every  with  (  is 0 here), T
halts on input S with oracles  iff S is in L. The nonlocal version allows
 to depend on the entirety of .
Notes:
* We use the term "level " (or -level) because for a number  in the range, the
maximum  such that  is from 1 to .
* As before, a strict version of fast-growing level  sequences (that does not affect
Definition 3.1) is to require  (  being 0 here); one
could also require  (with each  viewed as a set). The expressive power
remains the same, as one could simulate Turing machine that assume these more
restrictive versions, including a Turing machine that assumes the growth rates are
sufficiently high relative to the input size. This applies to both local and nonlocal
versions.
* The definition can be extended to transfinitely many levels, with
.
* We conjecture that local and nonlocal versions have the same expressive power (see
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Theorem 3.2, and Conjecture 3.3). The local version is more metaphysically
parsimonious, and has the same expressive power as if we treated a fast-growing
infinite level  sequence as an infinite sequence all of whose sufficiently long initial
segments are (in the sense of Definition 4.3(c)) sufficiently long fast-growing level 
sequences. However, quantification over sequences depends on the version. For
example, whether a Turing machine halts for some sufficiently fast-growing level 2
sequence (nonlocal version) is  complete.
Theorem 3.2: A language is recognizable by a Turing machine with the fast-growing
level 2 sequence oracle iff it is many-one reducible to the  game quantifier
(equivalently, to the set of winning positions in a  game on integers). This also
applies to the nonlocal version.
Proof: If a player has a winning strategy, then he has a winning strategy using moves
less than (position), where position includes the position in the game and a
canonical description of the rules. Given this constraint on the moves, the second
player has a winning strategy iff he has a strategy that enters then th open set
before time ( +position). Given these constraints, the game becomes an open one
with finite number of moves per turn, and hence recognizable.
For the converse, if a Turing machine  behaves uniformly (in either halting or not
halting) using a fast-growing level  sequence oracle, then  halts on input  iff the
first player wins the following game:
Player I: 
Player II: , optionally 
Player I wins iff  halts on  using  and some  with , or for
some ,  is undefined or inconsistent.
Since the winning condition depends only a finite segment of , it is . Player I can
make  (for some choice of ) a sufficiently fast-growing level 2 function.
Conversely, given a player I strategy, player II can simultaneously make  an
arbitrary sufficiently fast-growing function (strict version) and pick an arbitrary ,
and thus able to guarantee that  is a sufficiently fast-growing level 2 function.
Conjecture 3.3: We conjecture the following to have equal complexity ( ):
Recognizability using sequences of level .1. 
Recognizability using sequences of level  (nonlocal version).2. 
The game quantifier for level  of the difference hierarchy of (lightface)  sets
(level 1 is , level two is , level 3 is , and so on).
3. 
Monotone inductive definitions for co-recognizable sets (relative to the current
real number) for sequences of level  (for  if ).
4. 
Moreover, we conjecture that allowing number quantification in the model (i.e.
allowing arbitrary arithmetical formulas in place of Turing machines) corresponds to
boldface (in terms of  strength of the corresponding theory) or finitely iterated
versions of these properties.
Furthermore, using the results in [4], we appear to have the following equivalence:
(a)  is expressible using (3) (in Conjecture 3.3) for some .
(b)  is in the least  satisfying 
(these sets for each numeral  and relativized to each real  exactly capture the 
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strength of ).
(c)  is recursively reducible to the set of trees accepted by a tree automaton
(equivalently by a formula in S2S) (the reduction  is such that  iff  is a
(possibly infinite) tree that is accepted).
Towards Proving the Conjecture
Theorem 3.4: The set of Turing machines that halt for every (alternatively, some)
sufficiently fast-growing growing level  sequence (strict version) is many-one
reducible to the game quantifier for level  of the  difference hierarchy (as in
Conjecture 3.3(3)).
Note: Using theorem 3.5, the converse also holds.
Proof:
We prove that the machine halts for every such sequence iff player I wins the
following game:
player I: , and  for each undefined  ( ).
player II: , and  for each undefined  ( );
 (and cannot be played until  is defined).
Player I wins iff: (1) some  is undefined and for all 
(lexicographically)  is defined, or (2)  halts using  (querying an
undefined value waits without halting until it is defined).
Given an  (as in Definition 3.1), player I can force  to be consistent with . For the
converse, fix a strategy for player I, and without loss of generality, if  halts, set all
undefined  to some values. If for some choice of player II moves, player I fails
to produce some  with  defined for all lexicographically lower ,
player I loses, so assume otherwise. With some basic assumptions, for a fixed
complete , there is a finitely branching tree of possibilities (with each vertex
corresponding to an entry in ), and set  to be the largest possible value
of  at which player II can learn the next value of  if the current value of  is
defined and is . Using , one can choose  so that player II can get an arbitrary
 consistent with , and thus win unless the machine halts for every
such .
For the version where the machine halts for some such sequence, the game is similar
but with the second player winning if the machine halts, and the game quantifier for
the second player has the required complexity.
Theorem 3.5: A language is recognizable by a Turing machine with the fast-growing
level  sequence oracle iff it is many-one reducible to the game quantifier for
level  of the  difference hierarchy.
Proof:
    Theorem 3.4 proves (a strengthening of) one direction. In the other direction,
games on integers with the payoff in level  of the  difference hierarchy can be
coded by games on {0,1} with the payoff in level . Furthermore, the payoff can be
converted to the following form: First player wins iff the highest event priority seen
infinitely often is even for odd  and odd for even  (where event level 0 occurs on
every step). Events will be observable (computable), and a higher priority event is
also counted as an event of all lower priorities. Fix such a game, and for each
position, a winning strategy for the right player. We show that the game is equivalent
to the following modification: If after time , a priority  event is not seen until 
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then the player (who wants level  to be seen infinitely often) loses. (The loss happens
at time , and if the losing condition is met for multiple  (with ),
the lowest one controls.) This is an open game on {0,1} and hence recognizable.
    Set  (in any specific way) such that if the player (who wants an odd level to be
seen infinitely often) wins starting at some position at time , then using the strategy
we fixed, and regardless of the opponent's moves, the next event (or a victory) will be
seen before time . Since , the game and strategies are unaffected
by the modification with . Now compute  using the same strategies,
events of priority 2, and the modified winning condition. (Technically, we have a set of
games, one per position; if the position is at time , the constraint only uses  or
higher.) Note that  can be chosen to only depend locally from , and furthermore,
we can detect a bad  and ensure that  remains defined.
Continuing further, we get all  (using bounded maximization to depend only on 
and not ), and combine them into  as in Definition 3.1.
It appears likely that for transfinite levels, recognizability for a level α sequence
corresponds to the game quantifier for level α of the difference hierarchy. In these
games, events can have α different levels, and if the lowest level event not seen
infinitely often is a limit, the second player wins iff α is even (limit ordinals are even
here).
Relation with monotonic induction:
* The game quantifier can be computed using monotonic induction: Use the previous
quantifier to find positions where player one can win while preventing the game from
getting into a state labeled with  (where player two wins if  is seen infinitely often),
and mark these positions as player one wins, and repeat with the modified game,
continuing using monotonic induction until no new positions are added. The other
positions are player two wins. (Side note: A winning strategy for player one would be
to play the auxiliary game for the step where the current position was marked, and
each time a previously marked position is reached, player one wins the auxiliary
game and switches to the auxiliary game that led to the position being marked. For
player two, the auxiliary game (this is not the auxiliary game for player one) is
keeping to unmarked positions, with a win if a state labeled with  is reached. For
both players, if the auxiliary game does not halt at a finite step, the winning condition
is the same as in the original game.)
* To simulate the multiple sequence oracle (conjectured), we can build the
computation tree where each vertex corresponds to a query to . Work backwards
from halting configurations, and using the previous quantifier for each step, use
monotonic induction to reach the initial state if it is halting.
Relation with nonlocal version and with arithmetic definability: We conjecture that by
using a -fold iteration of Hechler forcing, we get fast-growing level  sequences that
give minimal uniform definability.
Going much further (than level  sequences) but remaining inside a fragment of ,
an interesting nonfinitary notion (explored in literature) is that of infinite time Turing
machines. Such a machine is like an ordinary Turing machine, except that it can run
for an unlimited ordinal length, and at limit steps, the state of each cell (and the
machine state) becomes lim inf of the previous states.
i
Ai(n) i Ai(n) = Ai′(n
′)
f1(n)
n
f1(n) A1(n) ≥ f1(n)
A1 f2(A1)(n)
n A1(n)
f2 A1
A1(n) < f1(n) f2(A1)
fi Ai
A1, . . . ,Ai−1 f
k k
k
Ak
k k
k Δ12
9
4 Finite Structures
The infinite structures have finite analogues. A key concept is that of a sufficiently
fast-growing sufficiently long finite sequence. Sufficiently long is with respect to the
rate of growth, and is preserved under extending the sequence. In computation,
along with input, we will be given such a sequence, with the first element sufficiently
large relative to the input size. Vagueness will be avoided because there is no error in
interpreting "sufficiently" too strictly. What we are defining are not the sequences
themselves, but the results of the computations — for computations that agree for all
appropriate sequences (and thus will still agree if "sufficiently" is interpreted too
strictly). The appropriate sequences can then be formally defined as the ones giving
the correct results. Also, by using infinite sets, we can quantify over all possible
definitions (like we did for the fast-growing sequence oracle) and thus formally define
the results without using "sufficiently".
Let us now describe the construction in detail. In the definitions, 'vague' indicates
dependency on a notion of 'sufficient'.
Vague Definition 4.1:
(a) A sufficiently long fast-growing sequence is a finite function 
such that
  -  is sufficiently large (relative to the problem size),
  -  is sufficiently large relative to  ( ), and
  -  or an initial segment of  is sufficiently long relative to its rate growth. The rate
of growth is how large is , and how large is  relative to  (for  in
the range of the initial segment).
(b) A sufficiently long fast-growing sequence or its extension is any finite extension of
a sequence in (a).
(c) (generalization of (a)) A sufficiently long fast-growing level  sequence is a
sufficiently long finite sequence of sufficiently long fast-growing level  sequences
such that once the sequences are expanded to numbers, each number is sufficiently
large relative to the previous one. Here, a level 0 sequence is a number sufficiently
large relative to the problem size. "Sufficiently long" may depend on the sequence
(specifically, required length is relative to the rate of growth or its analog) but if a
sequence is sufficiently long, then so are all of its extensions.
Note: One useful representation of a level  sequence is a function
 with  iff  is the last element (after expansion into
a sequence of numbers) of an included level  sequence (and ;
alternatively set  since with  extensions of the sequence are
represented by extensions of ). For example, (((1,2,3),(4,5,6,7)),((10,11),(12,13,14)))
would be represented as (0,1,1,2,1,1,1,3,0,0,1,2,1,1,4).
In one finitistic treatment, we assume that in certain contexts, 'sufficiently' is a
primitive concept — it can be explained, partially axiomatized, and connected to
other concepts, but not formally defined in terms of more primitive concepts. (On the
other hand, one could argue that our uses of 'sufficiently' and other terms are a
recharacterization of aspects of infinity.) Using that concept, given a particular
Turing machine T, we can define a predicate  as  holds iff  accepts given input
 and a sufficiently large/complete/etc example (relative to  and ) of the
appropriate type, provided that  is a machine that halts with the same (dependent
on ) output for every  and sufficient example. While without context, 'sufficient' is
g : {0, . . . ,N} → N
g(0)
g(n+ 1) g(n) n < N
g g
g(0) g(n+ 1) g(n) n+ 1
k+ 1
k
k
g : {0, . . . ,n} → {0..k+ 1} g(x) ≥ i x
i− 1 g(n) = k+ 1
g(n) = k g(n) = k
g
P P(n) T
n n T
T
n n
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vague, the above usage is (at least arguably) precise because it does not depend on
how the vagueness is resolved. One would then finitistically study the properties of 
and other such predicates, and develop axiom systems. However, with a little
reasoning, many uses of "sufficiently" can also be formally defined using infinite sets,
and we will use infinity as a shortcut and to unambiguously interpret the concepts in
existing mathematics.
Template Definition 4.2.
Assumption: We are given a set of potential examples, and a set  of possible notions
of sufficiency: The notions must form a directed set under strictness, and each notion
must be nonempty, or the definition fails. Alternatively, instead of , we may be given
 that is equivalent to  in that for every notion in  there is at least as strict notion
in  and vice versa.
(a) A property holds for every sufficient example iff there is a notion  in  such that
the property holds for every example in .
(b) A predicate  is computable using a sufficient example (assuming the examples
are reducible to integers) iff there is a Turing machine  such that for every , 
outputs  given  and a sufficient example (that is for every sufficient example;
sufficiency depends on ) as input.
(c) Given a well-defined language, a sentence using a sufficiently good example as a
parameter is well-defined iff there is a valid notion  such that all elements of 
agree on whether the sentence is true, which is then the truth value of the sentence.
To apply the definition (which we will sometimes do implicitly), we need the set of
possible notions of sufficiency. Here is one choice, noting that selection between
equivalent (as used in 4.2) sets may be arbitrary.
Definition 4.3:
(a) A notion of sufficiently long fast-growing sequences is valid iff there is a function 
such that for every infinite sequence  with  and , there
is  such that every initial segment of  of length at least  is sufficient.
(b) The extension for 4.1(b) is trivial. (A notion of sufficiently long fast-growing
sequence or extension thereof is valid if it is the closure under finite extension of a
valid notion in (a).)
(c) A notion of sufficiently long level  (fast-growing) sequences is valid iff there is
a function  and a valid notion  of sufficiently long level  sequences such that for
every infinite sequence  of elements of  with, when  is expanded into a sequence
of numbers,  and , there is  such that every initial
segment of  of length at least  is sufficient. For every ,  is a valid
notion of level 0 sequences.
Theorem 4.4:
(a) A predicate is computable using a sufficiently long fast-growing sequence iff it is
 in the hyperjump of 0.
(b) A predicate is computable using a sufficiently long fast-growing sequence or
extension thereof iff it is .
Notes:
* There should also be an analogous statement for 4.3(c).
* A finite sequence (as in (a)) is more expressive than the corresponding infinite
sequence because it gives us a stopping point.
* For mass problems (where the correct answer is non-unique), the notion in 4.1(b)
P
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can be used to compute  separation (with the choice of the correct answer
depending the sequence). A weakening of 4.1(b) that does not allow that would be to
store the sequence as a predicate so one cannot test whether one reached the end.
Proof:
(a) The algorithm above (Theorem 2.2) for testing well-foundness (with reaching the
end of the sequence indicating an infinite path), will work correctly and compute the
hyperjump of 0 up to a sufficiently large unspecified point in the sequence. In
deciding a  in the hyperjump of 0 problem, use the partially computed hyperjump
of 0 to check which of the two opposing sequences (for the sentence and its negation)
terminates first: For inputs in the size limit, that will happen before that unspecified
point.
Conversely, a machine that behaves uniformly halts iff for every growth rate , there
is a finite sequence  growing faster than  such that for every sufficiently-fast
growing finite extension of , the machine halts. Extensions of  can be considered
independently of , so this is  in the hyperjump of 0.
(b)  predicates are clearly computable. For the converse, for every rate of growth 
, there is a finite sequence  with  such that the output is given on
every continuation of  (and one similarly has a  description).
Without uniformity, we have the following.
Proposition 4.5: For every ,  is  in the hyperjump of 0 where
∀S quantifies over sufficiently long fast-growing sequences.
Proof: Consider the following game (  is move number,  is fixed):
First player: .
Second player: .
At any point, either player can request to stop.
The first player wins iff once both players request to stop,  holds, or the first
player requests to stop, but the second player never does.
This game is a concatenation of an open game (before the first player asks to stop)
and a closed game afterwards (also, φ can be tested using a closed game) without
extra parameters, so the game quantifier is  in the hyperjump of 0. The first player
can force the  to be some sufficiently long fast-growing sequence, and relative to a
strategy for the first player, the second player can force  to be an arbitrary
sufficiently long fast-growing sequence, so the first player wins iff  holds
above, as desired.
If we allow the computers to produce sufficiently long level  fast-growing sequences
unlimited number of times (for variable input length), this corresponds to an infinite
sequence of level . However, to make the (arguably) finitistic definition as
concrete as possible (and to allow a more fine-grained hierarchy of notions), we limit
ourselves to a single application (of the producer of the sequences), and to
correctness with respect to an ordinary Turing machine using that application.
Restrictions on Length
(Disclaimer: Statements here were not formally verified.)
     In addition to considering sufficiently long sequences, we can also consider fast-
growing sequences  with specific length conditions. Given a recursive well-founded
relation '≺', a natural corresponding length condition is the following: There is no
 with  and  being the length of . Computability for
Π11
Δ11
A
h A
h h
A Π11
Δ11 g
h h(n+ 1) > g(h(n))
h Σ11
Σ11 φ {n : ∀S φ(n,S)} Π
1
1
i n
A1(i)
A2(i) ≥ A1(i)
φ(A2)
Π11
A2
A2
∀S φ(n,S)
k
k+ 1
g
x0 ≻ x1 ≻. . .≻ xn xi < g(i) n+ 1 g
12
sufficiently fast-growing  with this length condition equals  (or  for finite )
where  is the rank of '≺'.
     For fixed finite ,  having length  corresponds to ordinal  for '≺'. If  is a fixed
recursive function with , then  having length  corresponds
to (computability using) . The independence of expressiveness on  may appear
counterintuitive — if we increase the length of  by 1, we can compute the halting
problem for appropriate machines that use the shorter  — but we cannot determine
which machines are valid (in the sense of being independent of the choice of
sequence), hence halting reversal does not increase expressiveness. Going further,
length  corresponds to , length  — ,  —
 (superscript indicates repetition),  — , and
similarly using nested superscripts and ordinals below .
Axiomatization
It is insightful to axiomatize key properties of level  sequences. A recurrent theme is
that axioms using infinity give us symmetries and that using 'sufficiently large' (and
constructs that build on it), we can axiomatize finite versions of these symmetries.
Using nonstandard numbers: Intuitively, a sufficiently long level  sequence (or
another construct using Definition 4.2) can often be treated as if it were a definite
partially unknown object, and we can formalize this analogously to Robinson
nonstandard analysis. Add a predicate symbol  for small numbers (which will include
all standard numbers), an axiom that  is a proper cut, and a schema (over
definitions) that if  is small and  is definable from  then  is small. In Definition
4.2, augment the directed system so that it is a filter. Given a language L, a
sufficiently good example will be an example that satisfies all notions with a 'small'
definition in L. An alternative is to work inside L augmented with , add a constant
symbol for some sufficiently good example, and add appropriate axioms that are true
for every sufficiently good example.
If one wants an axiomatization without nonstandard numbers, infinite structures, or a
function symbol : →(an example sufficiently good relative to ), one can do as
follows. Add a symbol for a sufficiently good example and (optionally) a predicate for
small numbers. Identify a class  of functions that we know are independent of the
example provided that the example is sufficiently good relative to the argument of the
function. Add axioms: (1) (schema,  in )  is small, (2) (schema,  in ) for small
,  is well-behaved, and perhaps other schemas of that nature. Prove theorems as
usual, but when interpreting the results, assume that the schema works only up to
some sufficiently large code "f", and is thus consistent with a particular example.
Variants of the finitary treatment above include having two notions of "small", so that
invariant small-1-length definitions only define numbers that are small-2, or one can
have more notions of "small", and partially simulate "small" being a cut. Alternatively,
one can avoid "small" as a predicate, and instead interpret "small" using the first
element (or equivalent) of the sequence (and the second element for the second
notion of "small", and so on), and remove these elements from the sequence (or do an
analogous operation).
We now attempt to axiomatize nonlocal level  sequences. We will use arithmetic
g 0(α+1) 0(α) α
α
k g k k h
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g
g
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augmented with a symbol meant to represent a level  sequence, and the intent is to
capture key properties of the sequence without using infinite sets. The axiomatization
will be generic, allowing both finite and infinite sequences, with an added condition
to choose the type and length. Its strength and consistency are unclear. For the finite
version, the axioms are  above the sequence, and they might have a 
strengthening by requiring that a witness for  does not increase by the reduction in
. If a bounded axiomatization is desired (so that satisfiability of a finite fragment is
), use φ for which (syntactically) any witness must be bounded above , and (if
desired) use a schema over cut-off points to give the axiomatization a non-arbitrary
strength.
The sequences will be coded as predicates and strictly monotonic. A bounded shift of
 above  is a strictly monotonic  with . 
exists iff  exists. The idea is that a bounded shift will preserve the desired
structure of  while erasing (or be capable of erasing) detectable particularities of
the exact choice of numbers.
Let  be a reasonable universal -formula. We say that  is level  invariantly
true iff  holds using  for every combination of bounded
shifts above . We formalize this as a -formula by requiring a bound on the
witness that works for all shifts (by König's lemma, this is correct).
Axioms:
* Base system such as EFA or PRA or -PA or PA.
* Basic properties of :
   -  exists as a number
   -  is strictly monotonic, and if  exists and , then  exists.
   - If , then  (and if  is infinite, then so is ).
* Formalization of sufficiently large:
   - If it exists, the least  such that  is level  invariantly true is below  (if
 exists).
   - (schema over ) (optional, or can be as long as desired) If it exists, the least  such
that  is level  invariantly true is below .
Here is one choice for the finite sufficiently long condition. Different choices give
different strengths. For level 1, the strength here appears to correspond to .
* (optional) Each  is finite.
* (schema, or a particular choice of ) There is a bounded shift (above 0) 
such that  satisfy the axioms for level  sequences for some
 such that  exists (  indicates iteration).
Note: For infinite , simply asserting their infinity should give a good theory. The
second statement can still be used for bounded shifts of sufficiently long initial
segments of .
If true and not derivable from more basic axioms, we also want to add the following:
If a  statement  is true for some bounded shift  above , then for
every ,  is true for some bounded shift  above  (  codes the
statement; the statement depends on  second order parameters). This applies to
k
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the infinite version; and if  exists, also to the finite version. The added
condition ensures that  is sufficiently long. Note that a  statement cannot
directly test whether an end of  is reached. Also, without the statement, it is not
clear whether different levels of  agree on well-foundness. The statement can be
supplemented with a schema over  using bounded shifts above 0 and  (and place of
 and ). For an infinite level 1 sequence , we may also want to state (if not already
provable) that well-foundness of a  relation that is invariant above  is unchanged
by using a definable (or restricted definable) infinite subsequence of  in place of .
This also applies to the highest level of a higher level sequence if trying to get the
most out if it.
5  Truth
We now give an arguably finitistic definition of  truth. Essentially, this section
informally describes in detail a variation on level 2 estimators of the next section.
In the computational model, along with input, we are given a finite set of finite
sequences. Each sequence is sufficiently long relative to itself, or relative to its rate
of growth. (Optional) If  is sufficiently long and  and ,
then  may be considered sufficiently long. (Optional) For the purposes of
determining sufficient completeness (below), arbitrary conditions may be imposed on
the sequences as long as they do not impose an upper bound on the rate of growth
(as used here, an upper bound would be a function  such that for every permitted
sequence , ). Given these conditions, the set is sufficiently
complete for the input size. Completeness is preserved under addition of new
sequences or decrements to input size. We are not given the conditions on the
sequences, but regardless of what they are, the algorithm below is guaranteed to be
correct.
The algorithm aims to check whether the sentence encoded in the input has a
transitive model. It enumerates potential initial segments (whose length equals the
length of the longest sequence in the set of sequences we were given) of the truth
predicate for the language with a distinguished symbol for a well-ordering of the
elements. Each segment is checked for a quick (relative to its length) inconsistency
with the sentence. If not found inconsistent, it is converted into a finite quasi-model,
with elements coded by sentences of the right syntactic form:  codes the least
such  if true, and 0 if false. Then, for every sequence  (in the set of sequences we
were given) with  larger than the input size, it tries to form a descending path
 of elements with  . If the path reaches
length , the truth predicate is rejected; otherwise it is accepted by the
sequence. The algorithm returns 'yes' iff a truth predicate segment is accepted by all
sequences.
To see that the computation is correct, note that if a sentence has a transitive model,
then it has a transitive model of bounded complexity, and hence without sufficiently
long descending sequences of the required type. If it does not have a transitive
model, then in the complete binary tree of candidate truth predicate initial segments,
every path will have an infinite descending sequence (or inconsistency). Thus,
regardless of how strictly "sufficiently long" is defined, every path will have
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sufficiently long descending sequences; furthermore, excluding all sequences that are
above an infinite path would be an upper bound on the rate of growth (as used
above), which is prohibited. By König's lemma, a finite set of such sequences can
cover all paths, and thus a sufficiently complete finite set will suffice.
The construction has an infinite version, namely a predicate or a tree on finite
sequences of natural numbers. Consider a well-founded tree of such sequences
(ordered by extension) such that every non-leaf node can be extended by any natural
number, and if a sequence is a leaf node, then it is sufficiently long relative to itself
(or relative to its rate of growth; the difference does not affect the expressive power)
— or any tree that is a well-founded extension of such a tree. Using such a tree,
recognizability is  complete. (However,  may be a better analogue of being
recursively enumerable: The relevant parameter is not the halting time but the
ordinal depth of the visited portion of the tree for nonhalting runs, which corresponds
to the complexity of the least witness for a  statement.) In one direction, the above
computational procedure works, except that if the theory has a well-founded model,
we do not halt. In the other direction, the machine halts iff for every well-founded
tree  for every non-halting computation corresponding to an extension  of ,  has
an infinite path, which is .
We can extend definability by using an infinite sequence of numbers growing
sufficiently fast relative to the tree. Recognizability should then correspond to having
a  monotonic inductive definition. A stronger extension (likely still ) is to use an
-tuple of trees, with sequences in each tree sufficiently long relative to themselves,
and to every previous tree.
6 Second Order Arithmetic
Vague Definition 6.1:
A level 0 estimator is a pair of natural numbers  with  sufficiently large, and 
sufficiently large relative to .
A level n+1 estimator is a sufficiently complete finite set of level  estimators, where
'sufficient completeness' is defined such that it does not prevent the notion of level 
estimators from being arbitrarily strict.
(Sufficiency depends on the problem/calculation considered.)
Notes:
* Given a finite set of problems, a single notion of sufficiency works. Given a
countable list of problems, a single notion of sufficiency works, except that minimum
 depends on the problem size.
* Without affecting the expressive power, instead of 0-estimators, we could have
started with level -1 estimators being sufficiently large numbers (or even every
number being a sufficiently good level -2 estimator).
* A variation that leads to the same expressiveness for  estimators is to drop the
condition on ;  will be sufficiently large relative to  and the problem considered.
* An example of the "arbitrarily strict" qualifier is that even if we admit  as a
level 0 estimator, there are sufficiently complete level 1 estimators with every
included  satisfying .
The above definition is vague but the following is well-defined regardless of how the
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vagueness is resolved. (As written, Definition 6.2 is well-defined relative to the choice
of an estimator and (for bad estimators) the choice of 'standard rules', but given
Theorem 6.6, neither is relevant if we use Definitions 6.3 and 6.4.)
Definition 6.2: Computation of second order arithmetical truth:
* Use standard rules to convert the sentence (or its negation) to
 where , each  is a quantifier, and  is a bounded
quantifier formula that does not use  (and  can even be chosen to be polynomial
time computable), and each  is a set of natural numbers.
* Pick any (it does not matter which one) level  estimator on problem sizes at least
as large as the sentence. The sentence is true iff it passes the estimator.
* A formula  (  as above) passes a level zero estimator  iff
.
* A formula  passes an estimator iff for every binary sequence , 
passes at least one of the estimators included.
* A formula  passes an estimator iff for some binary sequence , 
passes all of the estimators included.
(Note: Because  is bounded quantifier and an estimator is finite, the search over 
is also finite).
To intuitively see that the description is correct, if a  statement is true, then it has
a witness (for the outermost existential quantifier) of bounded complexity. Level 
estimators will work correctly with that witness and hence the sentence. On the other
hand, if a  statement is false, then every potential witness will be intercepted by
some level  estimator, and hence the falsehood will be witnessed by a
sufficiently complete set of such estimators. By induction on , the method is correct.
To prove correctness, we first have to formalize what we want to prove. If we treat
'sufficiently' as a parameter in the definition, we naturally get the following:
Definition 6.3:
* A notion  of 0-estimators is valid iff there are  and  such that
.
* A notion  of  estimators is valid iff
    (1) Every element of  is finite. (A reasonable variation (immaterial for below):
Also require elements to be non-empty.)
    (2)  is valid and . (Equivalently, there is a valid
notion  of -estimators such that every element of  consists of elements of , and
adding an element of  to an element of  results in an element of .)
    (3) For every valid notion  of -estimators, there is an element of  consisting of
elements of , i.e. .
Definition 6.4: A sentence (in second order arithmetic or another well-defined
language) using a (sufficiently good) -estimator as a parameter is well-defined iff
there is a valid notion  such that all elements of  agree on whether the sentence is
true, which is then the truth value of the sentence.
Note: This is simply Definition 4.2(c) applied to valid notions of estimators.
The truth value of a well-defined sentence is unambiguous:
Proposition 6.5:
(a) Every valid notion of -estimators is non-empty.
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(b) Given two valid notions  and  of -estimators,  is also a valid notion.
Proof:
(a) This follows from 6.3(3) and existence of the trivial notion of -estimators that
includes everything of the right syntactic form.
(b) Assuming  (  is easy), note that  and  are valid. Assume that the
proposition applies for , and let  be an arbitrary notion of  estimators.
Thus,  is valid. There is  and  such that  and
, and for every such , we have , which satisfies (3) in the
definition. Using a similar argument, , and (2) follows.
Theorem 6.6: The above notion/computation of second order arithmetical truth is
well-defined and agrees with the actual truth.
Proof: We will use a conservative extension with nonstandard numbers (see
discussion in Section 4). Augment the language with a well-ordering of real numbers
(this simplifies the proof if the base theory does not prove projective uniformization).
Let  be a proper cut of natural numbers closed under exponentiation. An 
-estimator will be an estimator that is valid for every valid notion definable in second
order arithmetic (with the well-ordering) using  as a parameter, with the definition
in . An estimator is an -estimator for the empty . We show by induction on  that
the computation works for -  estimators for formulas in  that use  as a
parameter.  is trivial.
If  is true, then  holds for some  of bounded complexity relative
to , and hence every - -estimator will handle  correctly.
If  is false, then for every , every - -  estimator will reject .
Thus, for every valid notion of -estimators, using König's lemma, there is a finite set
 of -estimators such that for every  there is  that rejects . Therefore,
every - -estimator rejects .
 is analogous.
Note: Using  spared us some complexity of tracking permitted problem sizes.
If sufficiently complete did not obey the "arbitrarily strict" (for previous levels)
qualification and we used a definition like Definition 3.1, the expressiveness using 
-estimators ( ) should collapse to that of being hyperarithmetic in the th
hyperjump of 0. (Essentially, enough level 0 estimators give us a sufficiently fast-
growing sequence , and levels 1-k estimators would give us  special points (each
sufficiently large relative to the previous points and the growth rate of ), including
the final point of .)
For readability, we sometimes use -estimator to mean an estimator sufficiently good
relative to . The reason is that we often intuitively (and sometimes formally) reason
as if 'sufficiently good' has a concrete meaning, but that only works if 'sufficiently
good' is parameterized by the free variables of the formula. An example (giving a key
property of estimators) is that for every continuous predicate  on  and 
-estimators  and , .
The estimators have an infinite version: A predicate that codes a sufficiently strict
valid notion of -estimators. Recognizability for machines using such predicates
(where the machine must work for every sufficiently strict notion of -estimators)
appears to equal . Also, even without the condition on  for 0-estimators, a single
predicate suffices for all input sizes: Given input size , the machine can pick 
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-estimators such that for every included level 0 estimator , , and then
ignore 0-estimators  with .
This completes our description at the level of second order arithmetic. What remains
is finitistically studying which axioms to include in the system, and relating infinite
statements to natural statements about finite structures. If, for example, projective
determinacy for the results of the estimations will be deemed a finitistically
acceptable axiom schema, we will have a finitistic consistency proof of ZFC.
We take a key step in this direction by interpreting projective determinacy in terms of
finite games and a basic interaction of adjacent levels of estimators. A possible
intuitive interpretation is that completeness for level  estimators does not
negate completeness for level  estimators.
Theorem 6.7:
(a) Lightface projective determinacy holds iff for every  and every primitive
recursive predicate  ( ,  and (below)  are predicates on natural
numbers), for some (equivalently, every) level  estimator  (sufficiently good
relative to ), one of the players has a winning strategy in the following game:
player I - , player II - , player I , player II , ...
player I wins iff 
player II wins iff 
(b) Projective determinacy holds iff for every  and every  (as
above), for some (equivalently, every) level  estimator  (sufficiently good
relative to ), for every , there is  such that one of the players has a winning
strategy in the above game (using ).
Notes:
* By virtue of the bounds in  (which can be extracted from a primitive recursive
definition of ), , , and  can be treated as bounded sets, and the game is finite.
* For every , there is a single well-behaved  sufficient for  determinacy (both
lightface and boldface): Player I chooses a  game and wins if he wins that game
and player II does not play a code for a winning strategy for player I. Also, given an
estimator  (or ) testing who wins (and whether the determinacy holds) is primitive
recursive.
* Instead of "primitive recursive", we could have used "elementary time", or in the
other direction, continuous (and for (a), continuous and definable in second order
arithmetic). König's lemma is used implicitly in the proof.
* We do not require for  to be well-behaved.  is well-behaved iff for every ,
 is independent of  if  codes a sufficiently good (relative to ) 
-estimator. One can show that an equivalent formalization of well-behaved is that for
some (equivalently, every) estimator - -estimator ,
.
Proof:
(a) We show that the first player can win the finite game iff he can win the infinite
game corresponding to , with the ambiguity in the construction of  resolved in
favor of the first player:  iff for every notion of -estimators there is a 
-estimator  with , equivalently iff for every (equivalently, some) - -
- -estimator , . Combined with the same result for the
second player, and given the complexity of the formulas, this leads to the equivalence
with the determinacy.
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Let  be the function converting (player I strategy, player II strategy) into the
corresponding plays. Note that  is the same for both the finite and infinite game.
The first player has a winning strategy in the infinite game iff
.
Fix an  such that  is winning if player I can win. Thus, we can assume that all
estimators are sufficiently good relative to , and the winning condition becomes
. This implies that there is a finite set  of
level  estimators such that , and therefore every 
-estimator  will work, and the first player wins the finite game by using .
Conversely, if the first player has a winning strategy in the finite game, fix a notion
- -estimators. Build an infinite tree of first player strategies (ordered by
extension) for the first  moves that do not lose against any of the estimators (here,
an incomplete game is not a loss), and pick an infinite path (and strategy) . The first
player wins the infinite game using  because for every  he wins the finite game
corresponding to a - -  estimator.
(b) The proof is analogous to (a) with an extra quantifier pair to handle , or
alternatively, easily follows from the relativized version of (a).
Axiomatization
While the above theorem is an equivalence and not just an equiconsistency, we also
want an equiconsistency with a simple intuitive axiomatization of estimators that
does not use infinite sets. We expect that the following axiomatization works.
A - -estimator will be an -estimator sufficiently good relative to . We idealize
'sufficiently good' with a schema such that if the schema is cut off at any finite point,
there are particular notions consistent with the axioms. An alternative would be to
explicitly adjust  based on the formula size (and in the axiom 7 and definition of
explicitly invariant below, use a number coding the subformula, the free variables,
and  in place of ).
We start with arithmetic, and add a predicate for - -estimators, with one predicate
symbol per . An alternative to a predicate would be a function:  → example of -
-estimator, and application of basic closure operations would lead to a predicate
consistent with the axioms. Also, with some added complexity, one can axiomatize a
single example of a - -estimator and using minimal arithmetical axioms.
Definition: A formula is explicitly invariant if all of its uses of - -estimators are in the
form  (  is - -estimator) ... where  is the maximum of the free variables (not
including ) at that location of the formula, and  is a numeral. Finite sets will be
coded by numbers (using any reasonable coding).
Note: The intent is that by virtue of its syntactic form, the formula is independent of
how strictly we construe 'sufficiently complete'.
Language: arithmetic (using natural numbers), with predicates for - -estimators,
with one predicate symbol per .
Axioms:
1. Basic arithmetical axioms.
2. Induction for all formulas. [note: limited induction likely also works]
3. Every number is a -2- -estimator.
4. A -  estimator is a finite set of - -estimators.
5. Adding a - -estimator as an element to a - -estimator results in a -
G
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-estimator.
6. Every - -estimator is a - -estimator.
7. (schema over explicitly invariant ) whether 
holds is independent of the choice of the - -estimator . [note: symbol
 permits equality, but that is immaterial here]
8. For every , a - -estimator exists.
Axiom 7 (combined with axioms 4 and 5) simply asserts that  is sufficiently complete
as tested using  and .
The axioms are consistent and sound in that every finite fragment is satisfied using
every sufficiently strict function:  valid notion of - -estimators (valid as in
Definition 6.3;  is the maximum  used in the fragment).
Variations on Explicitly Invariant: The class of explicitly invariant formulas can be
broadened somewhat: With the axiomatization remaining sound,  can be replaced
(including in axiom 7) by  (using a schema over ) where  is explicitly
invariant and is defined without using free variables and . If the
notion of - -estimators is sufficiently strict relative to -  estimators, the class
can be broadened further still. It is unclear if we need any restriction for 
other than (1) every use of estimators is  (  is - -estimator) where
 (  as above; also note that the variables that are free in the
subformula of φ but not free in φ are unrestricted) and (2) a positive  (  is -
-estimator) ... cannot appear inside a negative  (  is - -estimator) ... and vice
versa.
We conjecture that the axioms are equiconsistent with second order arithmetic Z2,
and that the addition corresponding to the above theorem (using a schema over , or
a quantifier over codes and -code(P)-estimators, or even a single universal instance)
is equiconsistent with Z2 + lightface projective determinacy for (a) and Z2 +
projective determinacy for (b).
7 Beyond Second Order Arithmetic
7.1 Estimators with Transfinite Levels
To go further, we can define transfinite levels of estimators. For an ordinal 
(alternatively, for consistency with -estimators, limit ), an -estimator is a
sufficiently complete collection of estimators of lower levels, with α being marked in
the estimator, and where 'sufficiently' complete is defined so as not to preclude
notions of lower level estimators being arbitrarily strict. Level 0 estimators are as
defined above (Definition 6.3 or an alternative).
Definition 7.1.1:
A notion  of -estimators ( ) is valid iff:
(1) Every element of  is finite.
(2)  is a valid notion of -estimators.
(3) 
(4) For every valid notion  of -estimators, there is an element of  all of whose
elements are elements of .
k n+ 1 k n
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A notion  of -estimators is valid iff:
(5) For every , the set of -estimators in , , forms a valid notion.
(6) (Coherence) For every , . (Here  and .
Informally, different levels of  agree on which estimators of lower levels are valid.)
Proposition 7.1.2:
(a) For every ordinal , there is a valid notion of -estimators, and every valid notion
is non-empty.
(b) For valid notions  and  of -estimators,  is valid. Similarly, intersection of
two valid notions of -estimators is valid. Also, for , .
Proof:
(a) This follows from the existence of the trivial notion that includes every set of the
right syntactic form. (Also, any valid notion of -estimators has a trivial
corresponding notion of -estimators.)
(b) Assume this holds for smaller  (and  is immediate). Let  be  and  be
. Verify that  is a valid notion of -estimators: (5) ,
which is valid, and (6) . Thus,
there are  with  and  with , so , and (using (3) for
 and ) every element of T' is in , so . Finally, (4) holds
because for a valid notion  of -estimators,  is also valid.
Thus, using Definition 4.2, we can meaningfully speak of 'for every sufficiently good 
-estimator'.
Definability of reals using estimators of levels below  appears to equal to
definability in , at least when  is not too large. Note that for a definition using
-estimators not to (overtly) use infinity, we would need a coding of ordinals up to 
by integers.
Estimators with Rational Levels
Countable ordinals can be embedded into rationals, and one extension of transfinite
level estimators is to use estimators with rational levels. Level 0 estimators will be as
before, and a higher level estimator will consist of the level and a sufficiently
complete finite set of lower level estimators, but the treatment of 'sufficiently
complete' is more subtle. Rational numbers are not well-ordered, but we work around
that by in effect defining estimators for sufficiently complete (unspecified) well-
ordered subsets of nonnegative rationals.
Given a notion  of -estimators and a zero-preserving order-preserving injection
, there is a natural translation of  to , :
 not in the range of  - every finite subset of  is included (as a level  estimator
in ).
 in the range of  - a finite subset  of  is included if after recursively deleting
from  all estimators of levels that are not in the range of , removing duplicates, and
applying the inverse of  on the levels, we get an element of .
The above definition works even if  is a non-well-founded linear order, and in
particular for . The set of notions of estimators derived from a notion of 
-estimator and  (variable countable  and ) forms a directed system under
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β < α β R Rβ
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strictness, which allows Definition 4.2 to work.
The expressiveness for computations that use sufficiently good estimators with
rational levels probably equals to  definability in  for the least  such
that  is not  definable in  (and thus  is large but countable here).
If the system used finite ordinals instead of countable ordinals, the expressiveness
appears to equal the Turing degree of second order arithmetic. The difference is that
(with finite ordinals) if we use (for example) a level 1 estimator to get estimators of
level 1/2, 2/3, 3/4, 4/5, ..., we still get enough levels of estimators, but there is no
assurance that an estimator of level  is sufficiently complete relative to  for
large  (or even non-empty, and we do not know when to stop considering higher
level estimators).
A caveat (even for the full system above) is that if we use (for example) a level 1
estimator to get estimators of level 2/3, 3/5, 4/7, ..., then for a sufficiently large , we
may get an empty (or otherwise small) estimator for level . Of course, if 
is not too large (or if the completeness is relative to ), all included level 
estimators would still be (essentially) sufficiently complete. There might be
interesting notions of estimators with rational levels that handle such descending
sequences differently (or other interesting notions of estimators with rational levels
in general). Perhaps, such notions can be used to compute game quantifiers (and
strategies) for games of countable length.
7.2 Using Pattern Enumerators
A (not necessarily finitistic) notion related to that of a sufficiently large Turing degree
(or more closely, fast-growing infinite sequence of Turing degrees) is that of a
sufficiently closed pattern enumerator.
Vague Definition 7.2.1: A sufficiently closed pattern enumerator is a function
 such that
-  is character  in the infinite binary string corresponding to pattern .
Numbering of patterns is permitted to be arbitrary.
- if  follows a sufficiently simple pattern relative to , then  is in the range
of .
- (optional for our purposes) if  and  are in the range of , then so is their join
 .
For example, for some ,  for all , but the least such  may be arbitrarily
large. Also, without the optional condition, enumerators  and  can be trivially
combined into an enumerator of patterns included in  or .
As before, we can use Definition 4.2 for unambiguous usage of sufficiently closed
pattern enumerators. A valid notion of 'sufficiently simple' is simply a function that
for every element of  assigns a countable subset , with stricter notions assigning
more inclusive subsets, and pattern enumerators are defined accordingly.
Let  be sufficiently closed pattern enumerators such that  includes
 as a pattern, and  be a sufficiently fast-growing sequence relative to the
enumerators.
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Assuming sufficient determinacy, we can recognize the set of winning positions of
games of integers of length  with  payoff as follows. Replace the first  moves
of player I by a strategy  for these moves where  (chosen by player I) is in ,
replace the first  moves of player II by strategy , such that  join  is in , and
so on replacing the first  moves with  and reducing game length to
 (if ). We might not be able to go further with  since  does not
recognize its behavior as a pattern, but we can use  for the first  moves of the
modified game and so on, converting the game to one of length . We then constrain
the move values using , and if there is a strategy (for the first player) that wins at a
finite stage, halt with 'accept'. We conjecture the converse to hold as well (assuming
sufficient determinacy).
Notes:
* Without a sufficiently fast-growing sequence , an unspecified sufficiently closed
pattern enumerator is essentially useless to a Turing machine since it may be
arbitrary up to an arbitrarily large finite point.
* Sufficiently closed pattern enumerators have a number of equivalent (in terms of
expressiveness) definitions. For example, we may view them as pattern detectors with
 being the least  such that  starts with .
* To go further, we can use a transfinite sequence of pattern enumerators, with each
enumerator including the sequence of enumerators of lower levels (combined into a
binary sequence) as a pattern.
* If we used 'sufficiently simple pattern' instead 'sufficiently simple relative pattern
relative to ', we should get the same expressiveness by using  enumerators in
place of , while requiring each enumerator to include all sufficiently simple patterns
with respect to the join of the lower level enumerators.
* Like fast-growing sequences, the enumerators (and chains of them with the fast-
growing sequences), have a finite version; simply cut off the chain (coded as an
infinite string) at a sufficiently large number relative to the chain and the problem
size.
Weak versions and computational complexity: Let an enumerator be constant but
unknown. Recognizability for polynomial time computation equals NP (no time limit
on nonaccepting computations; assumes binary access to indices; unary access
corresponds to unary NP under many-one polynomial time reducibility). If we are also
given a point such that every sufficiently simple pattern comes before it, P-time
decidability equals PSPACE, and if we also have access to randomness, P-time
(probabilistic) decidability captures ENP (and hence NEXP), but is within -EXP. If
we are only required to be correct for sufficiently large instances (without using the
large point above), decidability appears to equal  (with recognizability ).
Arithmetic definability using the enumerator (equivalently, computability using a
fixed length sufficiently fast-growing sequence) equals definability in second order
arithmetic. However, if the enumerator is not required to be closed relative to every
pattern in it (i.e. if it may simply code a sufficiently large Turing degree), arithmetic
definability corresponds to membership in the minimal transitive model of ZFC\P + "
 exists" for some ; this is related to the complexity of Borel determinacy.
Axiomatization
While computability using pattern enumerators is  definable (with Definition 4.2), it
is insightful to axiomatize its key properties instead, as follows. We have not
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determined the strength or consistency of the axioms; we do not have a proof that
bounded shuffles (below) permit the required erasure. We first axiomatize 
analogously to axiomatization of a sufficiently long fast-growing sequence in Section
4 (not included in the axioms below), with  being sufficiently good relative to the
enumerator or list of enumerators  (unshuffled) (except that for the finite version,
the cut-off point will be above  (and thus could code )). The below only
assumes  and that  is monotonic, with sharper bounds possible if
. The axioms are valid only for the domain of . A level 1 infinite
sequence appears to have the minimum expressiveness required (including for the
transfinite extension below). However, the axioms below appear to depend on a level
2 sequence or higher to ensure that well-foundness as tested using  agrees with
well-foundness as tested using pattern enumerator(s). For a level 1 infinite sequence,
we would also want that for every  there is  such that  is the hyperjump
of  as tested using  (this also applies to the transfinite extension below). Below, 
as a numeric function refers to the lowest level. Also note that the section 4
axiomatization is for the nonlocal version.
As before, a bounded shift of  above  is any  with 
(for multilevel , each level is shifted separately).
A bounded shuffle above  (applied to the indices of ) is any permutation  with (for
every )  and .
A computation  using  and  (both unaltered by the shift/shuffle) is invariant up
to  iff for every ,  is the same for every bounded shift and shuffle above
 and without the computation reaching the cut-off (if used) of the
enumerator..
Axioms:
Join axiom:  join  is  for some .
Completeness axiom/schema: If a computation  (using  and ) is invariant up to
 then there is  with  agreeing with  up to .
Notes:
* Since the tree of possibilities is finitely branching, the invariance for a particular
example is recognizable.
*  is accessible as a predicate, so a computation cannot test whether the end of 
(for the finite version) was reached.
* The completeness axiom is a schema over primitive recursive (or other desired
complexity) . Alternatively (if we want there to be a particular example), we can use
a quantifier over  (and ), but without using a schema, the
provable degree of completeness will be arbitrary for  for small  (and for the
finite version of the enumerator, arbitrary about how far above  we can go).
The completeness axiom states that if the computation is known (in a certain manner)
to be invariant of the particular choice of  and , then the output is already a
pattern. We do not have a predicate for pattern enumerators, but the expectation is
that the shifts and shuffles can erase the extra information from the choice of  and .
The exact treatment of 'bounded' (above) appears unimportant as long as it allows
the erasure while keeping  (or some derivative) sufficiently long and fast-growing
relative to the shuffled .
Transfinite Extension
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To go further, a sufficiently closed pattern enumerator of ordinal length will be a
transfinite sequence of sufficiently closed pattern enumerators, each including a join
of the previous ones as a pattern. Actually, the use of 'ordinal' (as opposed to just
ordered) is superfluous since sufficient closure prevents an infinite descending
sequence. It will be coded as  - character  of pattern  from enumerator .
The ordering of patterns and of enumerators is permitted to be arbitrary. For the
ordinal length, one choice is to require the ordinal to be sufficiently closed relative to
the notion of the pattern enumerator. Definition 4.2 works here (using the club filter
for ordinals and using sets of reals as notions of pattern enumerators). We use 
for  being a pattern in . We use  as before.
A bounded shuffle and invariance will be as before, except as follows:
* Each enumerator is shuffled independently. For enumerator , a shuffle above 
is above .
* Require the transfinite join axiom (below) to hold after the shuffle.
* Also apply a bounded shuffle to the indices of the enumerators.
* An enumerator used as a parameter will also be shuffled.
Axioms:
* Join:  join  is  for some .
* Transfinite join: Each enumerator  includes a pattern enumerating all other
enumerators that do not include  as a pattern.
* Completeness: If a computation  (using ,  and ) is invariant up to ,
then there is  with  agreeing with  up to .
Notes:
* See the note above about formalizing  (including use of ).
* Well-foundness of ' ' should be provable (if using a level 2  or higher). If using a
level 1 , we can add a well-foundness axiom: .
It is unclear if stronger axioms are needed.
* Using , transfinite join can be a  (or even bounded by ) statement instead of
a  statement.
Here is one choice of the ordinal closure axiom (different choices give different
strengths):
There is an index  with  such that for every computation 
(using ,  and  with ) that is invariant up to , there is  and  with
 with  agreeing with  up to .
Notes:
* The condition on  (before 'such that') means that the ordinal corresponding to  can
be arbitrarily large (we assume that the schema for  is not cut off before it
reaches the condition of the axiom). One can can create a stronger condition on 
using a schema that invariant properties reflect onto  (  dependent on the schema
instance).
* This axiom should correspond to existence of an arbitrarily large ordinal 
(represented by  and thus within the range of ' ') that becomes a cardinal in the
model after higher level pattern enumerators are replaced with their invariant
properties.
* We can go further by using indiscernible ordinals. A weak version is to strengthen
the above axiom by having a tuple (using a schema or a quantifier over tuple length,
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with the tuple length included in the bounds) of enumerators such that if a
computation (using a subtuple as a parameter) is for every subtuple invariant (up to 
), then the pattern  (above) is independent (up to ) of the subtuple, other than
the length and '≺'-ordering of the subtuple, provided that  for every index
 in the subtuple (the condition on  is not necessary for ).
* One can extend the language further by including a sufficiently small club of
countable ordinals (or a fast-growing tuple or sequence of such clubs) as a predicate
and basing indices on a generic well-ordering of , but it is unclear whether we have
enough absoluteness to get a natural theory.
If consistent, these axioms appear to capture the basic form of the system, and
perhaps the large cardinal strength (corresponding to enough Woodin cardinals).
What remains is proving the strength of the system and finding natural axioms that
capture appropriate large cardinal strength and make the theory reasonably
complete for the results of invariant computations.
7.3 Using Countable Infinity
We can also consider what can be expressed using real numbers but without using an
uncountable infinity. One way to increase expressiveness is to allow an infinite
alternation of real quantifiers. Formally,  can be defined as true when the
first player has a winning strategy in the game where the players takes turns to play
 and the goal of the first player is to satisfy the formula after the quantifiers. Under
reasonable axioms, this leads to expressiveness beyond L(ℝ). For every countable
ordinal  (at least if  is not too large), real numbers definable from a countable
ordinal using  real quantifiers are precisely those that are in the minimal
iterable inner model with  Woodin cardinals. Just  real quantifiers go beyond
first order definability in L(ℝ).
This definition uses strategies, which are formally uncountable. However, we can
avoid the uncountable by introducing a notion of  having a sufficiently large
complexity (under Turing reducibility) relative to . As before, vagueness is avoided
because every sufficiently strict notion works here. We obtain the necessary
complexity by using a sequence of  real numbers, each sufficiently complex relative
to a join of the previous real numbers. Statements with infinite alternations of
quantifiers can be decided by restricting the complexity of the strategies: For  levels
of play, the strategies must be recursive in the 's member of the sequence. By
determinacy and by sufficiency of the sequence, this does not affect who wins. We
can go even further by using sequences with ordinal length sufficiently long relative
to themselves. Reaching higher complexity is an endless endeavor.
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